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HARVARD

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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES

Product	Jan-Dec 1985	% 1985 over 1984
Electricity (bil.kw.hrs)	1545	104
Petroleum (inc. gas condensate) (mil.tons)	595	97
Natural Gas (bil.cu.mtrs)	643	109
Coal(mil.tons)	726	102
Steel (mil.tons)	155	100.2
Fertilizer (mil.tons)	33.2	108
Metal-cutting tools (mil. rubles)	2674	112
Robots (1000s)	15.2	107
Computer Technology (bil. rubles)	4.2	113
Tractors (mils.)	52.8	104
Paper (mil. tons)	6.0	102
Cement (mil. tons)	131	100.7
Meat(mil. tons)	17.1	100.6
Margerine (1000 tons)	1.4	100
Watches(mils.)	67.2	100.2
Radios(mils.)	8.8	94
Television sets (mils.)	9.4	104
Automobiles (1000s)	1.3	100.4

YEAR END PRODUCTION RESULTS

The year end results as we have been saying for the last several months do show some improvements since Gorbachev assumed control. Again the main focus is on the petroleum industry. As we predicted in the January newsletter, oil production reached 595 million tons. That is 18 million tons what it was in 1984, but the rate of decline is only 3% not the 4% that it had been before. Moreover production in December was down only 2% or less. Because the Russians do not publish the exact figure for December, we have to estimate it and given the rounding of figures that takes place, it is difficult to be precise.

While production for oil does seem to have improved in recent months, the fact remains that the Soviet leadership is still quite displeased and this helps to account for some of the very critical articles that have appeared in the Soviet press recently. Other figures presented in the final report for 1985 suggest that the oil figure plans were only 96% completed. Particularly distressing is the fact that labor productivity was only 94% of what it was expected it would be. It is reasonable to assume that there will be more personnel changes in the petroleum industry.

In other industrial sectors, production also has improved recently. Unlike last year for example, coal production increased whereas in 1984 there was a slight drop.

CURRENCY FIGURES

Rubles Purchased Per 100	Jan 1985	Dec 1985	Jan. 1986
Austrian shilling	3.95	4.30	4.36
U.K. pound	99.38	109.58	109.15
W. German mark	27.81	30.24	30.65
U.S. dollar	87.95	76.42	75.85
French franc	9.08	9.91	10.00
Japanese yen	.346	.381	.375
Italian lira	.0452	.0447	.0449
Swiss franc	33.13	36.65	36.40

Continuing the trend of the last several months the dollar declined, dropping from 76.42 to 75.85. The West German mark appears to be gaining strength, now purchasing 30.65 rubles per 100 marks. A slight decline is apparent in the U.K. pound and the Swiss franc.

LIVESTOCK HERDS (Millions)

	Jan 1985	Jan 1986
Cattle	121.0	120.7
Cows	43.6	42.8
Hogs	77.9	77.6
Sheep & Goats	149.2	146.5

As the table indicates, there was a drop in all livestock herds. This is the first time that has happened in some time. While some of the herds have been dropping, this has been offset by the fact that some of the others have been increasing. Now there was as drop in every single category. At the same time however official statistics indicate that the government purchased larger quantities of livestock products in 1985 than it had in 1984. This is also reflected in the increased sales of meat and other products. However a recent visit to the Soviet Union indicates that meat supplies are still in short supply and this is further confirmed by the speech of the poet Yevtushenko in which he refers to the fact that meat products are still rationed in many Soviet cities.

ARDEN HOUSE - THE TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

The program for the Arden Conference on East-West Relations was sent out to the subscribers of this newsleter a few weeks ago. If for some reason you haven't received your invitation yet, please let us know and we will send out another copy. We enclose in this newsletter only the application form for Arden House.

We are pleased to announce an addition to the program. Congressman Dante Fascell, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has indicated he will also attend the conference and participate in the congressional panel. Immediately following the conference his tentative plans call for a visit to the Soviet Union to meet with senior Soviet government officials.

Given the interest in current developments in the Soviet Union and the Party Congress, not to mention the forthcoming summit meeting, we are experiencing a good registration and for those of you who have not yet sent in your application, you should do so soon.

THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER takes no official stand on any economic or political trend. The views and analyses expressed in this Newsletter are those of the authors directly associated with the article, or unless otherwise stated, with those of the editors, Marshall I. Goldman and Catherine Reed.

RRC @ 1986

U.S.-Soviet Trade Expectations Fade

What a difference a year makes, particularly in U.S.-Soviet relations. A year ago many thoughtful Soviet intellectuals were actually worried that the arms race might lead to war. Now, after two formal summit-level meetings in Geneva, both sides are speaking of cooperative agreements. Even arms control no longer looks like an impossibility.

But we should not exaggerate. Unlike the 1970s, what we have so far is more like a dent—not detente—and expectations are more subdued if not more realistic. In part this is a natural reaction to the over-optimism of the 1970s.

A good example of this more subdued stance is the way U.S.-Soviet trade is being treated this time around. At the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, trade was a major agenda item, and predictions of agreements and billion-dollar contracts flowed readily from both Moscow and Washington; this time trade seems to be more an afterthought from the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. As with human rights, the casual reader has to search for mentions of trade in the reports from Geneva. Unlike fusion research or chemical weapons, trade is not even given its own paragraph in the formal communique. In fact, the only mention of trade is in a five-paragraph section headed "Process of Dialogue," and then it is included almost as a postscript.

While this de-emphasis is probably the conscious effort of Reagan Administration opponents to Soviet trade, there are signs that U.S. businessmen and Soviet leaders have lowered their expectations. After all, American companies will not soon forget the millions of dollars that several of them spent on plans and contract bidding and projects in the Soviet Union that were aborted after the invasion of Afghanistan. The resulting scars explain as much as anything does why last month's U.S.-Soviet trade and economic council meetings in Moscow attracted fewer senior chief executive officers than similar but more ebullient meetings did in the 1970s.

In his comments, Mikhail S. Gorbachev seemed as subdued as the American businessmen. While he spoke encouragingly of U.S.-Soviet trade, going so far as to arrange for his speech to be televised to the Soviet public, he also underplayed the volume of that trade. By stressing U.S. imports of the Soviet Union's goods, where we rank 13th among its hard-currency trading partners, rather than U.S. exports to the Soviet Union, where we are first or second, he may have been trying to suggest how much room there was to expand. Yet when he pointed to specific products that the Soviet Union might buy from the United States, he generally confined his list to machines for industry such as agribusiness, petrochemicals, chemicals, energy and the machine-tool industry itself. For the most part these would be low-technology exports, many of which even the Pentagon might tolerate.

On the Soviet side, this new realism partly reflects Gorbachev's leadership style, which is less bombastic and more attuned to the limitations of the Soviet economic system. Soviet authorities have come to recognize that imported technology has not been, and probably will not be, the solution to all their problems—at least as long as there is no reform of their economic system. At a minimum, Gorbachev has come to realize that he needs some new faces. That explains the widely reported purges in Soviet industrial ministries. Now it is rumored that as many as 200 officials in Soviet foreign-trade offices have been arrested on charges of corruption, and at least two—the chairman and the deputy of Technopromexport—have been sentenced to death.

But, for all his domestic efforts, Gorbachev seems to realize that before there can be any meaningful improvement in U.S. trade the Soviet Union must improve its treatment of dissidents and refusedniks. Only then will the United States move to relax some of the restraints that it imposes on imports from and exports to the Soviets.

Admittedly the initial efforts to reach accommodation predate Gorbachev, but he has continued the effort even if at a cautious pace. That accounts for the release of Yelena Bonner and about a dozen spouses of U.S. citizens and some long-term Jewish refusedniks. It also explains the various continuing meetings between Soviet officials and Jewish leaders in New York, Moscow and Paris, as well as the hints about the even larger-scale emigration in 1986 and the possible restoration of diplomatic recognition between the Soviet Union and Israel. It also accounts for the decision to allow each leader to address the other's country via television, and the somewhat more conciliatory tone coming out of at least some Washington offices.

It may be that we do occasionally learn from history. Unlike the euphoric 1970s, when visions of hundreds of millions of dollars in trade deals danced in our heads and trade was viewed as a means or linkage to improve political relations, today trade seems to be the end or reward for improved political relations. Given how controversial U.S. trade with the Soviet Union can be, this seems to be the more realistic and ultimately more fruitful way.

From the L.A. Times 1/7/86.

Marshall I. Goldman

01/15/86
17:24:31

All items in U.S. imports for consumption from USSR,
1982, 1983, 1984, January-November 1984, and January-November 1985

(C.i.f. value, in thousands of dollars)

SITC Number	Description	1982	1983	1984	January-November-- 1984	January-November-- 1985
0	Food & live animals	5,413	18,054	17,415	17,243	11,921
1	Beverages & tobacco	11,000	12,923	9,997	8,772	10,986
2	Crude mat'l--inedible,not fuel	10,049	12,075	19,353	18,725	13,843
3	Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc	10,946	59,158	202,563	162,408	106,076
4	Oils & fats--animal & veg prod	6	1	12	12	44
5	Chemicals	131,374	161,121	235,014	209,660	192,362
6	Man'd goods by chief material	63,349	91,304	107,794	98,850	62,281
7	Machinery & transport equip	1,624	3,750	2,874	2,467	3,969
8	Miscellaneous man'd articles	9,156	6,381	4,566	4,400	3,428
9	Commodities & transactions nec	5,277	2,341	2,494	2,397	3,587
	Total	248,195	367,107	602,081	524,933	408,496
	Total, all items imported from USSR	248,195	367,107	602,081	524,933	408,496

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

01/15/86
17:28:12

All items in U.S. domestic exports to USSR,
1982, 1983, 1984, January-November 1984, and January-November 1985

(F.a.s. value, in thousands of dollars)

SITC Number	Description	1982	1983	1984	January-November-- 1984	January-November-- 1985
0	Food & live animals	1,642,161	1,194,970	2,585,083	2,207,671	1,580,009
1	Beverages & tobacco	2,979	874	1,264	1,264	7,975
2	Crude mat'l--inedible,not fuel	214,249	264,583	224,263	220,395	86,916
3	Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc	90,013	22,571	30,045	21,611	52,947
4	Oils & fats--animal & veg prod	40,565	21,507	38,872	38,872	63,927
5	Chemicals	287,846	239,398	208,219	194,676	252,280
6	Man'd goods by chief material	25,961	29,755	16,573	14,056	9,040
7	Machinery & transport equip	225,458	149,452	110,221	97,768	106,821
8	Miscellaneous man'd articles	59,129	76,422	65,908	57,850	57,308
9	Commodities & transactions nec	614	2,419	2,205	2,010	1,749
	Total	2,588,975	2,001,951	3,282,652	2,856,173	2,218,972
	Total, all items exported to USSR	2,588,975	2,001,951	3,282,652	2,856,173	2,218,972

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: Trade does not include special category exports.

BALANCE OF TRADE

Balance of Trade for the first nine months of 1985 as indicated by the data in the Balance of Trade table, Soviet exports continue to fall. Since approximately 80% of what the Soviet Union normally exports is petroleum or natural gas, this is another indication that the Soviets have reduced their exports of these products sharply. Exports to the hard currency importers in Western Europe and Japan were down by 2.6 billion rubles for the first nine months of the year. This is a drop of about 20%, which was about equal to how much exports in the third quarter alone dropped. The drop during the first quarter of 1985 was 30%. It fell to only 10% in the second quarter but now is back up to 20%.

Another factor worth noting is that whereas the United States was the largest exporter to the Soviet Union up through the second quarter of 1985, the Soviet Union increased its imports from West Germany more than it increased imports from the United States during the third quarter and consequently West Germany is once again the largest supplier of goods to the Soviet Union, although the Soviets bought somewhat less in 1985 than they did in 1984 and 1983.

The net effect of all this is that the Soviet Union has a trade deficit of about 2.4 billion rubles as of the first three quarters of 1985. That contrasts with the surplus that they had earned during the same period in 1984.

BALANCE OF TRADE - 1st NINE MONTHS OF

1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 & 1985

(Million Rubles)

	Exports from the USSR					Imports to the USSR				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Austria	632	493	413	563	603	362	387	622	656	615
Belgium	350	774	741	902	658	342	421	449	380	425
Great Brit.	515	622	802	974	833	785	531	495	587	563
Greece	448	441	343	416	408	82	100	128	87	104
Denmark	168	268	221	275	213	194	53	54	73	76
Spain	216	106	229	224	148	347	127	182	227	291
Italy	1716	2209	2152	2388	1799	757	874	1119	983	970
Neth.	662	1175	1393	1243	770	385	282	410	188	227
Norway	44	59	59	78	91	73	56	75	60	51
Germany	2501	2982	2498	3478	3026	2099	2201	2685	2558	2400
France	1749	1664	1768	1695	1554	1289	958	1353	1246	1291
Switz.	183	326	394	290	244	390	311	274	293	384
Sweden	182	289	491	441	392	281	283	191	184	240
Japan	589	556	579	633	695	1593	2129	1707	1534	1849
Subtot.	10,000	11,964	12,083	13,600	11,026	8979	8713	9744	9056	9486
Sub-Bal. of Trade						+1021	+3251	+2339	+4544	+1540
Argentina	28	25	19	20	44	2069	1133	1153	983	1114
U.S.A.	105	112	171	210	228	1058	1811	1037	1734	1927
Canada	41	17	22	15	13	892	945	990	971	466
Australia	10	12	5	12	12	461	438	321	365	446
New Zealand	5	5	1	6	3	146	178	145	38	61
Brazil	9	122	85	93	48	523	356	429	396	300
Total	10,198	12,257	12,386	13,956	11,374	14,128	13,574	13,819	13,543	13,800
Balance of Trade						-3930	-1317	-1433	+413	-2426

Soviet and American Television: A Comparison of News Coverage

Ellen Mickiewicz

A crash program in the USSR to produce television sets has brought them into 90 percent of Soviet homes.

The Nieman Foundation and the Russian Research Center at Harvard University presented the program "Preparation for Geneva: Orientation for Journalists Who Want More Information on the Soviet Union." Nearly one hundred newspeople from the Boston area and out-of-state participated in the September day and evening event.

One session focused on social and economic developments. The following are excerpts from a transcript of the discussion by Professor Ellen Mickiewicz of Emory University, formerly dean of the graduate school and currently in the department of political science.

Marshall Goldman, associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and Professor of Economics, Wellesley College, organized the program, which was co-sponsored by the William and Mary Greve Foundation and the U.S. Department of State.

I would like to talk to you about Soviet media and in particular about Soviet television. I have studied the media in the Soviet Union for a decade or so, much facilitated, about a year ago, by the acquisition at Emory University of equipment to receive Soviet television directly. It is the only place in the country – Washington included – that receives domestic Soviet television in real-time and furthermore, to my knowledge, the only one that receives the major Soviet national network – First Program.

Let me begin by describing the importance of television. There has been a tremendous crash program in the provisioning of television in the Soviet Union. In 1950, there was a total of 10,000 sets in the country. By 1976, seven million sets were produced *annually* and in 1985, television sets can be found in 90 percent of all Soviet households. The reasons why the rate of growth was slow for so many years are several: For one thing, the country has a very inhospitable terrain. There are eleven time zones in the Soviet Union, spread over a vast and often inaccessible land mass. With the invention of modern communication satellites, many of these obstacles can be leapfrogged, and television can finally saturate the national population.

Also, I think the leadership in the

Photo: Michigan State University

past did not fully grasp the potential impact that television could have in the country. In the Soviet Union, as in the United States, viewers will say that the chief value of television lies in entertainment. That's true in both systems. In the United States, television is the main source of news, and in the Soviet Union, as a recent survey showed, the majority of the population now receives most of its news about the West from Soviet television. Considering the short time that television has been available to the Soviet population, this is an astonishing development. Most popular, of course, are movies, sports, and light entertainment, but two-thirds of the Soviet audience watch the prime-time network news.

Even though television is much newer in the U.S.S.R. than in the United States, television news is thought to be much more credible than written news. Why? Of course, pictures are very, very powerful, and people tend not to understand, either here or in the Soviet Union, that there is an editing process behind these visual images.

The question of feedback is a very interesting one. Soviet leaders thought they knew their audiences. The major national newspapers receive more than half a million letters a year; television and radio studios together receive more than two million letters a year from viewers and listeners. Obviously, those in charge thought they must know the public from the volume of that response. Recently a number of surveys were conducted that showed they were quite wrong, that official assumptions were unreliable.

First, for example, they found that newspaper readers did not understand many of the words frequently used in foreign-affairs newswriting: 50 percent did not know what "imperialism" meant; 75 percent did not know what "colonialism" meant. Another aspect of the media that the officials had not expected was essentially created by their own policies. What has happened – and I will go into this a little bit later – is that Soviet media emphasize the West so much, and in particular the United States, that they have created a thirst for international news in general, and for news of the West in particular. This has been an unintended result of their very own policy of stressing the importance of the West. It may be negative, but nonetheless it has excited that kind of thirst, that kind of reaction, and it is now causing considerable concern.

Timeliness. As you know, whoever breaks the story first has the edge in persuasive communication. In the past, timeliness never has been a value in Soviet news reporting. It was of lower priority than the educational role of Soviet news. It has now become a matter of some concern. Chernenko, in June of 1983, when he was top ideology official, talked about the West's "information-propaganda intervention." There is increasingly the sense in the Soviet Union that there are information sources around the Soviet Union, whether from foreign radios or interpersonal communication, that represent a kind of threat. It follows, therefore, that some kind of responsiveness and timeliness is going to have to enter into the reporting of news. Soviet reporting of international events, in fact, is given much greater credibility and authority by the Soviet audience than the Soviet reporting of domestic events. Again, as in the United States, it is both commonsensical and borne out by research. There are numerous opportunities for independent verification of an event that has happened near you: You've seen it, a friend has seen it, word-of-mouth transmits it. About international events there are really very few resources that an average American or Soviet citizen can exploit; there is very little evidence other than what the national media report. There is the same kind of difference in credibility, local and national, that you see in systems other than the Soviet, but it is also true that in the Soviet Union, national media are more credible than are the local media.

I will refer only briefly to the effect of Western radios. Probably about 20 percent of the Soviet adult population might listen at some point during the week to Western radio. This could be music, it could be some other program, not necessarily news, and it would appeal most to the well-educated, urban, European Soviet male.

I noted the fact that Soviet officials were really quite surprised when they had a first look – through surveys – at their own domestic audience. They were surprised by the lack of comprehension of certain commonly used terms and by the kinds of assumptions that they had had. There is evidence – and this precedes the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary – that the Soviet media system is moving to deal with some of the problems they have identified. For example, that dramatic press conference, when Marshall Ogarkov and two other officials talked about the downing of the KAL plane. Or, again, after the Soviets walked out of Geneva. The coverage of the Politburo, which is now done weekly, is an innovation. The new Foreign Ministry press conferences, led by recently appointed Vladimir Lomeiko, give information to the foreign press. I think we will see more departures of this sort, and I think we also will see an enhancement of production values on Soviet television.

Let me turn now to a look at the world in Soviet and American news. This is part of a project I've been engaged in for about a year (not all the data have been coded or analyzed): comparing ABC's *World News Tonight* and the Soviet prime-time news broadcast.

One of the first of the preliminary findings from this study is the difference in centrality, the asymmetry in the coverage of each other: how much more critically important we are for them than they are for us. In fact, the United States is really *the* other country, in terms of what the Soviet public sees in its news. The figures I'm going to present to you come from initial results based on a month of news broadcasts last fall. In that month, Soviet news devoted a total of one hour to coverage of the United States; ABC, a total of four minutes to the Soviet Union. The range of countries covered totaled 30 for ABC, 53 for *Vremya* (Time), the major Soviet news program.

In this period, on ABC, 61 percent of the stories were about the United States and 4 percent about the Soviet Union. On *Vremya*, 37 percent were about the Soviet Union and 10 percent about the United States. ABC broadcast a total of 277 stories during this period, while *Vremya* broadcast 552. The Soviet news is much longer than the American news, and that is in part behind these differences – but only in part. The Soviet news, excluding sports and weather, which I don't analyze, runs about 30 to 35 minutes, but it is elastic. News broadcasts can exceed an hour and a half, if necessary, expanding to whatever has to be covered. ABC, as you know, is 22 minutes of actual news broadcasting, and that is invariable.

Close to a third of all the stories that are not principally about the United States ascribe responsibility to the United States for events occurring outside of our borders. What kind of cognitive map is imposed on Soviet news? It is a map in which the world is coherent, and one reason for that coherence relates to the role of the United States, seen as manipulating, either by itself or through puppet governments, events that happen all over the world. The United States is shown to bear responsibility for much that happens, certainly of a negative sort, across the globe, and much of this is covered in very vivid footage from location.

As to the road to Geneva: If you were watching Soviet television these days, it would be grim. You might not think that there is going to be a summit meeting – not for lack of reference, but because of the tone of Soviet broadcasting. First, there is a barrage of stories, as you might imagine, about the Soviets' plea for weapons and testing moratoria and the American refusal to accept it. Recent ASAT [Anti-Satellite Technology] and SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] tests have been covered.

In certain cases, Soviet views are presented in stories about third parties. Very significant coverage was given to the visit of Johannes Rau, the SPD [Social Democratic Party] leader in West Germany, and clearly a man who is being cultivated by the Soviets. This visit coincided with very critical comments on Chancellor Kohl, whose telegram of greeting to German irredentists was seen as a threat to the Soviet Union.

Sometimes sources friendly to the Soviet Union – the Bulgarians, for example – on their national day, speak on Soviet television and refer repeatedly to the climate of danger and the American refusal to accede to Soviet proposals.

Another important technique for legitimizing Soviet positions is the citing of other countries' coverage of the actions of the Soviet government. Soviet media frequently refer to foreign coverage of their country. It is very important for the legitimacy of the Soviet position that *The Washington Post* or *The New York Times* or the *Economist* refer to the Gorbachev interview with *Time*.

Another element in Soviet news broadcasting is the assertion that all responsibility for the failure to ensure a peaceful world rests with the United States. Gvorgi Zubkov, the political commentator, recently stated that if there is no movement by the United States on the issue of the "militarization of the cosmos," then "nothing will happen at Geneva." *Détente* is raised again and again by the Soviet Union. I should add that the *détente* to which they refer has specific antecedents and specific components. It is not merely a vague term of approbation. When they invoke *détente*, they have in mind the kind that resulted in: (a) economic benefits – for example, the "great grain robbery" (as American opponents of *détente* dubbed it); (b) the agreement on the principles of conduct negotiated by [former Secretary of State] Kissinger, in a document that we consider less important than do the Soviets, particularly since the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence seems to have been embodied in the agreement; and (c) the Helsinki Accord, which specifies noninterference in domestic situations and which also ratified the postwar borders of Eastern Europe. That's what they mean by *détente*, and they would like to see it revived.

There has been a distinct change of tone on Soviet television from the time that I was looking at it, say, last fall or around the first of this year. It is more hard-hitting, and more anti-American. Let me give you an example. On one news broadcast, Genrikh Bardovik talked about anniversaries that should be observed: Why not observe the anniversaries of human rights violations by the United States? The murder of Allende, the ghettos in Washington, the thousands who have been killed in Vietnam, the child in Nicaragua who is killed by American strafing planes – these are the anniversaries we should talk about. There has been a great deal about human rights violations on Soviet news; for example, the violations of the rights of the American Indian activist [Leonard] Peltier*. Obviously one of the points on our agenda in Geneva is the question of human rights in the Soviet Union; these are counter-propaganda, preemptive moves on the part of the Soviet media to display American violations of human rights in advance of Geneva and information about the American position.

One rather remarkable program, almost reminiscent of Stalinist rhetoric, took place in the middle of prime time, 9:40 P.M. Moscow time. It was a documentary film, lasting about an hour. Its

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*Editor's Note: Peltier, a member of the American Indian Movement, was charged in 1975 with the killing of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. In 1977, he was convicted of the crimes and sentenced by Paul Benson, a federal judge with the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit. Since then, there have been two appeals, each case heard by the same judge. A new trial has been denied each time.

Representative Don Edwards, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, issued a statement in June 1985 asserting that there is evidence which demonstrates "government abuse of the investigative process, suppression of evidence and falsehood." Edwards has asked for a new trial for Peltier, to be heard by a new judge. [–Based on an article in *The Nation*, June 22, 1985]

subject was the pervasive attempt by American intelligence to subvert the Soviet system of government, carried out brutally in some cases by financing Russian fascist *emigres* – these are their words – who fought on the side of the Nazis. The viewer saw the carnage of Russian citizens due to these subversives backed by the U.S.A.

The film also showed the CIA as being responsible for and funding the Solzhenitsyn Fund. The Solzhenitsyn Fund, as you know, is supposed to be that collection of money from the royalties of Solzhenitsyn's books which is then given clandestinely to supporters of human rights in the Soviet Union. This program asserted categorically the funding came from the CIA.

The CIA was also shown to be behind Israeli intelligence, and it was implied that the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate was related to the intelligence mission. The visuals showed not only wartime footage but also footage from the trials of Soviet citizens who explained how Americans had tried to purchase their services.

The same themes of the Soviet peace initiative will be present in different kinds of programs; for example, a show on the Moscow Film Festival was not about film at all, but how film can be used for peaceful purposes – it was really about Cuba and Nicaragua.

Gorbachev is given tremendous coverage, and that is very different from the coverage accorded Chernenko. In the space of five days, there were two news broadcasts which led with a story on Gorbachev. In each, he gave a speech and each one lasted an hour and twenty minutes. There also has been significant reduction in the coverage of all other leaders. Some have just disappeared, like Tikhonov, but coverage of others has been reduced dramatically. And this is not a matter of inelastic time. As I noted, these are infinitely expandable broadcasts. The reduced attention to other leaders and the heavy coverage of Gorbachev is very meaningful in terms of Gorbachev's stature.

Let me close by saying that Gorbachev certainly is personally adept at manipulating the media, both at home and abroad, especially in comparison with his mummified predecessors! But I would argue that the move to make television more responsive and professional is a much longer-term issue and precedes Gorbachev. And it is related, I think, to the tremendous potential impact that Soviet television has, especially on a public that has been created, a public for whom international issues have become the most salient of all issue areas.

Question: You mentioned Bardovik a moment ago. Is there any attempt to build up any single commentator, as a kind of Walter Cronkite figure, or somebody who is viewed as trustworthy because he is seen talking about momentous matters?

Mickiewicz: The anchor is faceless and has, I would say, very little impact. But there are commentators, like Bardovik, who are brought out at especially important times and who have a kind of authority and ease which is quite remarkable compared to the rest of the talking heads that you see. Bardovik was the one, for example, who was trotted out for coverage of President Reagan's comment that "We're going to bomb the Soviet Union in five minutes," which Soviet television played in English to show its authenticity. Valentin Zorin is another well-known commentator.

Comment: If you look at the newspapers, in contrast to Chernenko, Andropov, and certainly Brezhnev, you don't see Gorbachev's picture in the papers as much. You see the speeches, pages and pages of speeches, which is comparable, but in the newspaper you really don't see him.

Mickiewicz: One of the things we intend to do is to look at the differences. And I think what you're looking at are two different audiences in the Soviet Union. As in the United States, when there was a gravitation toward television for much of this kind of information, much the same thing is happening in the Soviet Union. This is especially important since in the Soviet Union something like 40 percent of all the people in rural areas, and 20 percent of those in the cities, have not gone beyond the fourth grade. That means they really cannot read newspapers very easily.

Question: You mentioned the view of the world that the Soviets are getting from their news programs. What other segments of their programming are influencing them, would you say, in a major way, outside news programming? Would there be things like game shows, or anything else, entertainment?

Mickiewicz: There are many children's programs and many sports programs. The sports broadcasts are very refreshing, to me at least, because there's not much commentary: You can just watch a game. There are dramatic shows. Films are by far the most attractive to the Soviet audience, and they are featured frequently. There are also cultural programs, essentially uninterrupted productions of opera or symphony concerts. These, like PBS programs in this country, tend not to be very popular and the viewing audience is skewed upscale in level of education.

Question: Are there signs of any type of programming that imitates American programming in any way, for example, soap operas or game shows?

Mickiewicz: There are game shows, but they are not played for high stakes. Soviet television, of course, is fundamentally educational. It does not really appeal to greed, sensationalism, or the darker side of the human character.

Comment: I want to ask you about the timeliness you mentioned, because I had an opportunity to go to the television studios in Moscow last summer, and I was struck by the fact that at 3 o'clock in the afternoon they were doing a full-scale dress rehearsal of stories, pictures, film reports – the whole

thing – in advance of their 9 o'clock broadcast that night. And I'm curious whether you ever saw any kinds of chunks that were left out. . .or exactly what the time-line is between events and the time that they appear on Soviet television.

Mickiewicz: That's an interesting question, and one that we will certainly look at. What we are doing, just to tell you about the research project, is coding for ABC and Moscow television news every story for 27 variables. It will be a rather complex study. One of the things we will look at is the time lag and on which issues. Many of the issues covered by American television, particularly having to do with Soviet-American relations, are being reported on the day or on the next day. Of course it's eight hours earlier in the Soviet Union.

Question: Do you see an increase on Soviet television in the amount of coverage of the war in Afghanistan?

Mickiewicz: They have been covering Afghanistan certainly since last August when I began looking at the news. They have been covering it not so much in terms of a war of the Soviet and Afghan military battling the guerrillas. They cover it principally in two ways. One is to talk about the social revolution that is taking place, the distribution of land, the distribution of water rights, the education of women, the provisioning of medical personnel, and so on. They portray Afghanistan as developing into a system in the Socialist mode. They also talk about Afghanistan in terms of the intervention of Pakistan, and as a country threatened by Pakistan, behind which stands the United States with its supply of materiel.

To some extent more recently, there have been matters treating the military as such. There is one program, for example, that was a tribute to a rank-and-file Soviet soldier, who disarmed a grenade to save a group of children. There is a good deal of the sacrifice of Soviet troops, the elder brothers helping the Afghanis.

Question: You've been monitoring Soviet television. Have you come across anything comparable to our so-called white papers when one of the networks will focus on a particular aspect of investigative reporting?

Mickiewicz: The closest to investigative reporting is a kind of segment on the news called "Sharp Signal." Such a story would look at a dislocation in the economy for which there is some culpability. For example, the required amount of paper was not delivered to a newspaper plant. Or foodstuffs that have inexplicably and with human culpability or mismanagement disappeared or spoiled en route to the consumer. An investigative report, then, is given, with people interviewed all along the way, with a dire warning at the end that this must be cleared up. These are inserted in a very serious and weighty way into the news, and are sometimes followed a few weeks later by another segment detailing the remedial measures taken.

Question: Would you describe the extent of the coverage on Soviet television of the debate within the NATO alliance on Star Wars.

Mickiewicz: There is tremendous attention to Star Wars as an issue, and it is presented in various ways. The Soviet news does not present the issues in terms of specific plans and specific research that the Soviet Union has undertaken to meet the challenges. But there are two ways that it is countered in terms of stated Soviet policy: One is that the Soviet Union will produce as many offensive weapons as are necessary to counter any defensive shield – that there exists no successful defensive shield.

The other form of coverage is the more vague formula that the Soviet Union will do whatever is necessary to maintain its readiness. In terms of NATO debates, Soviet television portrays every case of deviance within NATO, or other partners of the United States, with respect to Star Wars. The Danish refusal to go along with it, the problems with President Mitterrand and every similar case is used to show the isolation of the United States, even from its own partners.

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